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YOUTH WORKERS; POLICE AND THE GANGS:

CHICAGO, 1956-1970

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BY

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FOREWORD

THE RESEARCH FOR THIS PAPER COULD NOT BE DONE IN LIBRARIES. THE MAIN SOURCE OF DATA WAS PEOPLE INVOLVED IN THIS SENSITIVE ISSUE WHO WERE WILLING TO OPEN THEIR FILES AND THEIR MEMORIES TO MY QUESTIONS. HAD THEY CHOSEN NOT TO, THIS PAPER COULD NOT HAVE BEEN WRITTEN. IT IS, THEN, WITH A SENSE OF OBLIGATION TO THEM THAT I WRITE THIS TREATISE.

THANKS SHOULD BE EXTENDED TO JOHN ROOT AND BRUCE COLE, RESPECTIVELY PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT OF THE YMCA OF METROPOLITAN CHICAGO; RUSSELL HOGREFE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE CHICAGO YOUTH CENTERS; HANS MATTICK, FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE CHICAGO YOUTH DEVELOPMENT PROJECT. EACH OF THESE LEADING FIGURES IN YOUTH WORK PUT HIS FILES AT MY DISPOSAL. I ALSO WISH TO THANK EACH OF THE YOUTHWORKERS AND POLICE OFFICERS WHO TOOK THE TIME OUT TO RELATE THEIR EXPERIENCES AND INSIGHTS TO ME. ALTHOUGH I WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO INTERVIEW MORE POLICEMEN AND GANG MEMBERS, THE PEOPLE WHO WERE INTERVIEWED PROVIDED A GREAT DEAL OF INFORMATION. SPECIAL THANKS SHOULD GO TO PROFESSORS IRVING SPERGEL AND RICHARD WADE FOR THEIR GUIDANCE DURING MY RESEARCH.

FINALLY, I SHOULD EXPRESS MY HOPE THAT THIS PAPER MAY GENERATE SOME LIGHT IN A CONTROVERSY WHICH HAS BEEN TOO LONG DOMINATED BY HEAT.

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PREFACE

FOR AS LONG AS MEN HAVE LIVED IN CITIES, YOUNG MEN HAVE BANDED TOGETHER TO ROAM THE STREETS AND SEEK EXCITEMENT. ALTHOUGH THEIR FORM AND PURPOSE HAVE VARIED WITH DIFFERENT SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND POLITICAL SITUATIONS, THERE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN FRIENDSHIP AND STATUS-SEEKING GROUPS PROVIDING MEANINGFUL SOCIAL ROLES FOR THE MEMBERS. MORE OFTEN THAN NOT, THEY HAVE COME INTO CONFLICT WITH PREVAILING SOCIAL NORMS AND BEHAVIORAL CODES.

URBAN STREET GANGS PLAYED AN IMPORTANT PART IN THE INITIAL PHASES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION. SINCE THEN, THEIR POLITICAL POTENTIAL HAS CONTINUED TO BE IMPORTANT TO THE CITY POLITIC. THE NEW YORK DRAFT RIOTS OF 1863 WERE LARGELY PROMULGATED BY YOUNG IRISH STREET GANGS. FREDERIC THRASHER WROTE OF THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF CHICAGO'S TURN OF THE CENTURY GANGS:

THE INFLUENCE OF THE BOY OR ADULT GANGS IN CITY POLITICS HAS ARISEN LARGELY THROUGH ITS ABILITY TO TRADE SOME ADVANTAGE IN THE WAY OF VOTES, INFLUENCE, MONEY, OR WHAT NOT, WITH THE POLITICIANS IN RETURN FOR SUBSIDIES, IMMUNITIES AND SO ON. IN THIS WAY GANG INFLUENCE HAS BEEN ENLISTED IN SUPPORT OF THE POLITICAL MACHINE.

ELECTION REFORM AND THE RELATIVE DECLINE OF THE MACHINE ALTERED THE DIRECT RELATIONSHIPS OF STREET GANGS TO POLITICAL PROCESSES. INDEED, THEIR POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE IN CHICAGO DECLINED TO ALMOST NOTHING BY THE END OF WORLD WAR II. AS A CLIENT FOR SOCIAL WELFARE GROUPS, HOWEVER, THEY BECAME MORE IMPORTANT. CLIFFORD SHAW'S CHICAGO AREA PROJECT, BEGAN IN THE EARLY 1930', WAS THE FIRST OF A LONG SERIES OF PROGRAMS AIMED AT CURBING DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR BY YOUTH GANGS.

WHILE THE PRIVATE WELFARE AGENCIES DEALT WITH CHICAGO'S STREET GANGS, THE POLICE, PROBABLY PREOCCUPIED WITH MAFIA ACTIVITIES, TENDED TO IGNORE THEM DURING THE DEPRESSION AND WAR YEARS. THE POST-WAR INFUX OF SOUTHERN NEGROES AND A CORRELATED INCREASE IN PUBLIC CONCERN ABOUT JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROMPTED INCREASES POLICE ATTENTION TO YOUTH GANGS. BY THE MIDDLE FIFTIES, PUBLIC OUTCRY WAS SO GREAT THAT BOTH THE POLICE AND THE SOCIAL WELFARE GROUPS MADE STREET GANGS A TOP PRIORITY IN THEIR ORGANIZATIONAL PURPOSE.

THE GOAL OF THIS PAPER IS TO DESCRIBE AND ANALYZE THE HISTORY OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN YOUTH WORKERS AND THE POLICE FROM 1956 TO 1970. THE STRUCTURE OF THIS PAPER COULD FOLLOW EITHER THE VERTICAL OR THE HORIZONTAL DIMENSIONS OF THAT RELATIONSHIP. THE VERTICAL DIMENSIONS WOULD BE THE INTERNAL GOALS AND STRUCTURES OF THE YOUTH GANGS. THE INTERNAL POLITICS AND EXTERNAL BEHAVIORS OF THE POLICE, THE BACKGROUNDS, IDEOLOGY AND ROLE IN THE GANG STRUCTURE OF THE STREET WORKERS (OR "DETACHED WORKERS", OR "EXTENSION WORKERS", SYNONYMOUS TERMS), AND THE COMMON AND CONFLICTING GOALS OF POLICE AND STREETWORKERS IN DEALING WITH THE YOUTH GANGS.

THE HORIZONTAL DIMENSION OF HOW THE ABOVE FACTORS CHANGED OVER THE LAST FIFTEEN YEARS PROVIDES A BETTER FRAMEWORK, HOWEVER. THIS IS NOT MERELY DUE TO THE FACT THAT IT IS EASIER TO WRITE HISTORY IN CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE. RATHER, THREE IMPORTANT PHASES OF THE RELATIONSHIP TOOK PLACE WHICH CAN BE SEEN BETTER IN THEIR PROGRESSION OVER TIME. MOREOVER, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STREET GANG WORKERS AND THE POLICE WAS AFFECTED BY THE GREAT SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGES

WHICH TOOK PLACE NATIONALLY AND LOCALLY. THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, THE WAR ON POVERTY, BLACK POWER, AND WHITE BACKLASH ARE ALL PART OF THE STORY.

THERE IS NO THESIS TO PROVE, NO QUANTIFIED OPINION SAMPLES TO INTERPRET. THE ACCOUNT OF A SUBJECT, THE "REALITY" OF WHICH WAS NEVER TOTALLY KNOWN TO ANYONE, IS NECESSARILY IMPRESSIONISTIC. FEW HAVE WRITTEN ON THIS TOPIC, POSSIBLY BECAUSE IMPRESSIONISM IS POOR SCIENCE, HOWEVER, CONSIDERING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CRIME, RACE, AND POLICE BEHAVIOR AS MODERN URBAN ISSUES, POOR SCIENCE MAY NEVERTHELESS BE IMPORTANT HISTORY.

THE FIRST SECTION IS THE "YEARS OF TRIAL", WHICH DESCRIBES AN ERA OF CORRUPTION AND BRUTALITY IN THE POLICE FORCE, A SUBMISSIVE ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF THE YOUNG BLACKS, AND THE FIRST TENTATIVE STEPS OF THE WELFARE AGENCIES TO "REACH OUT" TO GANG YOUTHS WITH STREET ORIENTED (NOT BUILDING - CENTERED) PROGRAMS. THE SECOND SECTION, "YEARS OF SUPPORT", DESCRIBES A TIME OF POLICE PROFESSIONALISM UNDER O.W. WILSON WITH CITY HALL AND COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA OF MIDDLE-CLASS STREET-WORKERS CO-OPTING GANG LEADERS. THE FINAL SECTION, "POLITICS AND HOSTILITY", CHRONICLES THE DEMISE OF STREET WORK AND YOUTH GANGS IN THE EYES OF CITY HALL, THE COMMUNITY AND THE POLICE, COUPLED WITH THE RISE OF THE SUPER-GANGS AND THEIR WAR WITH THE GANG INTELLIGENCE UNIT.

YEARS OF TRIAL: 1956-1960

WHEN JIM MORITA WENT OUT ON THE STREETS AS THE YMCA'S FIRST DETACHED WORKER, HE CONFRONTED A VERY DIFFICULT SITUATION. "SKYROCKETING" JUVENILE DELINQUENCY RATES HAD RECEIVED A GREAT DEAL OF PUBLICITY, AS HAD THE FREQUENT "HUMBUGS", OR INTER-GANG BATTLES. ACCORDING TO YOUTH WORKERS OF THE TIME, THE STYLE OF POLICE TREATMENT OF YOUNG BLACKS WAS SIMILAR TO THE STYLE OF SOUTHERN POLICEMEN: HARSH, VIOLATIVE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, PUNCTUATED WITH RACIAL SLURS AND EPITHETS, MANY OF THE YOUNG BLACKS WERE RECENT IMMIGRANTS FROM THE SOUTH; THE POLICE BEHAVIORS WERE RARELY CHALLENGED. MOST GHETTO YOUTH WERE ACCUMULATING JOB-INHIBITING CRIMINAL RECORDS WHICH MERELY COMPOUNDED THE PROBLEMS.

THE PRIVATE YOUTH WELFARE AGENCIES IN CHICAGO CLEARLY SAW THAT THEIR TRADITIONAL BUILDING-CENTERED PROGRAMS HAD BECOME IRRELEVANT IN THAT CONTEXT. THE CLIENT POPULATION WHICH THEY WANTED MOST TO HELP WAS NOT COMING TO THEM. DRAWING ON THE EXPERIENCE OF PROGRAMS IN CAMBRIDGE, MASS. AND OTHER CITIES, THE YMCA BEGAN ITS FIRST PROGRAM OUT OF THE CONFINES OF GYMNASIUM AND GAME-ROOM TO WORK WITH STREET GANG YOUTH ON THE STREET.

THE WIEBOLDT FOUNDATION BECAME ATTRACTED TO THE IDEA, WORKING THROUGH THE WELFARE COUNCIL OF METROPOLITAN CHICAGO, THE FOUNDATION SUPPORTED THE "HARD TO REACH YOUTH PROJECT", THE Y JOINED TEN OTHER PRIVATE WELFARE AGENCIES PARTICIPATED IN THIS VENTURE, EACH SPONSORING SOME STREET WORKERS WHO WERE ALL LOOSELY COORDINATED BY CATHERINE V. RICHARDS OF THE WELFARE COUNCIL. ALTHOUGH EACH AGENCY'S WORKERS PURSUED SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT GOALS WITH DIFFERING STYLES, THE WELFARE

COUNCIL STATED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE YOUTH WORKER WITH A STREET GANG WAS;

TO DETER THE GANG MEMBERS FROM ILLEGAL ACTIVITY, TO PROVIDE THEM WITH THE MEANS FOR SOCIALLY ACCEPTABLE (LEGAL) ACTIVITY, AND TO HELP INDIVIDUALS AND THE GROUP DEVELOP CAPACITY FOR AND SATISFACTION IN MANAGING RECURRING PROBLEMS OF GROWTH AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT.

HIRING YOUNG MEN WITH COLLEGE BACKGROUNDS AND ATHLETIC PROWESS FOR STREET WORKERS, THE PROJECT SOON DISCOVERED THAT REACHING THE YOUTH WAS VERY EASY, AFTER INITIAL SUSPICION THAT STREET WORKERS WERE POLICE UNCERCOVER AGENTS, THE STREET GANGS ACCEPTED THE NEWCOMERS AS FRIEND, COUNSELOR, ENABLER, MORAL CONSCIENCE, TEACHER, MODEL FIGURE. MUCH OF THE TIME THAT YOUTH WORKERS SPENT WITH THE GANGS AT FIRST WAS PASSED IN RAP SESSIONS; ATHLETIC PROGRAMS AND SOCIAL EVENTS FOLLOWED. CRIME DID NOT IMMEDIATELY CEASE, BUT THE SPOKESMEN FOR ESTABLISHMENT VALUES WERE ALLOWED INTO THE WORLD OF THE DELINQUENT SUBCULTURE.

THE POLICE DID NOT ACCEPT THE YOUTH WORKERS SO EASILY. THEY USUALLY FIRST MET THE WORKER ON THE STREET, OFTEN DURING A CRISIS SITUATION, THE VERY PRESENCE OF THE WORKERS IMPLIED THAT THE POLICE WERE NOT ADEQUATELY DEALING WITH THE GANG PROBLEM. THIS WAS AGGRAVATED BY THE POLICE PERCEPTION OF A PUBLIC WHICH LACKED RESPECT FOR THE FORCE. WHEN THEY HAD DEALT WITH EACH OTHER FOR A WHILE, STEREOTYPES OF EACH ROLE PERCEIVING THE OTHER (OFFERED BY MARY BLAKE OF THE U.S. CHILDRENS BUREAU, H.E.W.) WERE PROBABLY RATHER ACCURATE:

(THE STREETWORKERS SEEN BY THE POLICEMAN) IS SOFT; HE LETS YOUTH GO TOO FAR; HE OVERPROTECTS THEM; HE HAS TEAMED UP WITH THEM IN OPPOSITION TO LAW AND ORDER. (THE POLICEMAN, SEEN BY THE STREETWORKER) IS TOUGH; HE HAS NO REGARD FOR CIVIL RIGHTS; HE IS MORE INTERESTED IN PUNISHING PEOPLE THAN HE IS IN PROTECTING THEM.

THE YMCA GAINED A GREAT DEAL OF CREDIBILITY WITH THE POLICE IN 1958 BY HIRING A FORMER LAW ENFORCER TO SUPERVISE THEIR STAFF OF SEVEN STREET WORKERS. RICHARD BOONE, A YOUNG ASSISTANT TO THEN-SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY, JOSEPH LOHMAN, HAD RESIGNED UNDER PRESSURE FOR HAVING BEEN TOO DILIGENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES.⁷ THE FOLLOWING DAY THE YMCA HIRED HIM AND HE SOON WENT ABOUT STRENGTHENING THE TIES OF THE PROGRAM TO THE JUVENILE BUREAU OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT.

THE CHICAGO YOUTH CENTERS HAD A MORE DIFFICULT EXPERIENCE IN POLICE RELATIONS. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS SOME COOPERATION IN EARLY PHASES OF THEIR PROGRAM (BEGUN IN 1957), IT WAS SHORT-LIVED AFTER THE JAMES HALSELL CASE BEGAN. THE CASE AFFECTED POLICE ATTITUDES TOWARDS ALL STREET-WORKERS, NOT ONLY THOSE FROM THE YOUTH CENTERS. CYC WORKERS, THOUGH WERE SOMEHOW HARASSED MORE AND ARRESTED MORE.⁸ ALL OF THIS WAS A NATURAL POLICE REACTION TO A THREAT: ARREST FOR BRUTALITY.

IN 1958 NORMAN FELDMAN, A CYC YOUTH WORKER, HAD BEEN WORKING WITH THE "CLOVERS" IN LAWNDALE FOR ABOUT A YEAR. ONE DAY ON A SWIMMING TRIP HE DISCOVERED A SERIES OF LADDER-LIKE SCARS ON THE BACK OF ONE OF THE GANG MEMBERS, JAMES HALSELL. THE STORY FELDMAN ELICITED FROM HALSELL WAS THAT HALSELL HAD BEEN HELD INCOMMUNICADO IN THE FILLMORE POLICE STATION, HANDCUFFED TO A STEEL POST. HE HAD BEEN WHIPPED WITH A BELT BUCKLE, KICKED IN THE TESTICLES, AND FINALLY RELEASED WITHOUT CHARGE.

AFTER FELDMAN PRESENTED THE STORY TO THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, A FEDERAL GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION RETURNED AN INDICTMENT AGAINST TWO

FILLMORE DISTRICT POLICE OFFICERS. DELAYED FOR OVER THREE YEARS, THE TRIAL DID NOT BEGIN UNTIL AFTER ONE OF THE ACCUSED HAD DIED. FOLLOWING A LONG DELIBERATION, THE JURY RETURNED A VERDICT OF NOT GUILTY. THE VERDICT, HOWEVER, MADE LITTLE DIFFERENCE IN THE IMPACT OF THE CASE ON STREET WORKER-POLICE RELATIONS.⁹

THE HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS WERE FOUNDED IN SOME VERY FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES. ALTHOUGH THE BASIC GOAL OF REDUCING CRIME WAS HELD IN COMMON, THERE WAS OBVIOUS DISAGREEMENT ON TACTICS. A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE WAS THE ATTITUDE OF EACH ABOUT BREAKING UP OR REDIRECTING THE ACTIVITIES OF GANG STRUCTURES. THE POLICE, EVEN THE MORE PROGRESSIVE YOUTH DIVISION, TOOK IT AS AN ARTICLE OF FAITH THAT THE GANG PROBLEM WAS TO BE ERADICATED BY ERADICATING GANGS.¹⁰ THE HARD TO REACH YOUTH PROJECT WORKERS DISCUSSED THE MATTER IN 1959. WHILE THEY AGREED THAT SOME GROUPS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO DISBAND UPON REACHING MATURITY (EMPLOYMENT AND MARRIAGE AGE), IT WAS ALSO FELT THAT GROUPS MEET VITAL NEEDS FOR THEIR MEMBERS.¹¹

SEVERAL ARTICLES ON THE YMCA'S PROGRAM AT THE END OF THE FIFTIES GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT IT WAS DISBANDING THE GROUPS WITH WHICH IT WORKED.¹² ONE ARTICLE EVEN DESCRIBED A Y STREETWORKER AS 'A "GANGBUSTER",¹³ TO THE EXTENT THAT THE STREETWORKERS FOUND JOBS FOR THEIR CLIENTS AND OPENED UP OTHER POSSIBILITIES FOR ASSOCIATION, THEY WERE "GANGBUSTERS", HOWEVER, ALL STREETWORKERS BECAME COMMITTED TO THE CONCEPT OF YOUTH GANGS OR STREET CLUBS, (A LESS PEJORATIVE TITLE) AND FOUGHT TO PRESERVE THE RIGHT OF YOUTH TO BAND TOGETHER.

THE STRENGTH OF COMMITMENT TO THAT CONCEPT CORRESPONDED TO THE AMOUNT OF PRESSURE WHICH THE POLICE PUT ON THE GANGS TO DISBAND. IN THE EARLY YEARS, NEITHER WAS EXCESSIVE.

ANOTHER DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN YOUTH WORKERS AND THE POLICE CENTERED ON THE RESPONSE TO CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR MOST LIKELY TO CURB SUCH BEHAVIOR: REHABILITATION OR PUNISHMENT. THERE WERE SOME POLICE WHO ARGUED THAT PUNISHMENT CONTAINED A GOOD DEAL OF THERAPEUTIC VALUE AND THAT IT WAS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF REHABILITATING ANY CRIMINAL YOUTH. THERE WERE SOME STREETWORKERS WHO ARGUED THAT SUCH PUNISHMENT MADE ANY REAL REHABILITATION OF A YOUNG OFFENDER IMPOSSIBLE. RATHER, THEY FELT THAT INCARCERATION MERELY INSURED A LONG CAREER OF ILLEGAL BEHAVIOR AND ARREST.

THERE WAS DISSENTING OPINION IN BOTH GROUPS, HOWEVER, SOME OF THE POLICE DISPENSED "SUMMARY JUSTICE" ON THE SPOT, I.E., BEAT UP THE YOUTH WHO HAD BEEN CAUGHT AT VANDALISM OR STREET FIGHTING. THE YOUTH DIVISION OFFICERS WERE MORE APT TO TAKE A MISDEMEANANT YOUTH HOME TO HIS PARENTS FOR A STERN CONFERENCE AND LECTURE. ON THE OTHER SIDE, SOME STREETWORKERS CALLED THE POLICE TO THE SCENE OF CRIMES ABOUT WHICH THEY HAD ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE. THIS WAS MOST OFTEN DONE TO PREVENT "HUMBUGS", BUT SOME STREETWORKERS WOULD "DROP A DIME" (IN THE PHONE TO CALL THE POLICE) ON OTHER KINDS OF CRIMES.

"CONFIDENTIALITY" WAS A SORE POINT IN RELATIONS BETWEEN STREETWORKERS AND POLICE. "BECAUSE OF A WIDESPREAD MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE COMMON LAW CONCEPT OF MISPRISON, IT IS SOMETIMES ASSERTED THAT ALL CITIZENS,

INCLUDING SOCIAL WORKERS, HAVE A DUTY TO REPORT ALL KNOWN OFFENSES TO THE POLICE"¹⁴ SUCH IS NOT THE CASE IN THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, THOUGH SOME POLICE OFFICERS DEMANDED INFORMATION FROM STREETWORKERS, ~~OFFICIAL JUVENILE BUREAU POLICY WAS ONLY TO DEMAND FOR NOTIFICATION OF CRIMES ABOUT WHICH STREETWORKERS.~~ OFFICIAL JUVENILE BUREAU POLICY WAS ONLY TO DEMAND FOR NOTIFICATION OF CRIMES ABOUT WHICH STREETWORKERS HAVE ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE, ACCORDING TO CAPTAIN MICHAEL DELANEY, WHO HEADED THE BUREAU AT THAT TIME.¹⁵ OFFICIAL HARD TO REACH YOUTH PROJECT POLICY CORRESPONDED SOMEWHAT TO DELANEYS:

THE STREET CLUB WORKERS KNOWLEDGE OF DELINQUENT ACTS IS USUALLY AFTER THE EVENT AND AT SECOND OR THIRD HAND. WITH KNOWLEDGE IN ADVANCE OF AN ACT OF VIOLENCE ABOUT TO BE COMMITTED, THE WORKER USES EVERY MEANS AT HIS DISPOSAL, INCLUDING INFORMING THE PROPER POLICE OFFICIALS, TO HELP PREVENT IF HE CAN THE COMMISSION OF THIS ACT OF VIOLENCE. WHERE KNOWLEDGE IN ADVANCE OF AN ILLEGAL ACT (OF A NON-VIOLENT) NATURE COMES TO THE WORKER, HE MAY USE ONE OR ALL TACTICS SUCH AS: PERSUASION, A RECITAL OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACT IF THE PERPETRATORS ARE APPREHENDED, SUBSTITUTION OF OTHER ACTIVITIES FOR THE ILLEGAL ACTS, AND EVERY OTHER STEP SHORT OF INFORMING THE POLICE TO PREVENT THE COMMISSION OF ALL ILLEGAL ACTS EXCEPT VIOLENCE TO PERSONS.

THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF INSTANCES IN WHICH YOUTH OF THEIR OWN VOLITION, WITH THE HELP AND SUPPORT OF THE WORKER, HAVE SURRENDERED THEMSELVES TO THE POLICE. OTHERS, THROUGH THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE STREET CLUB WORKERS, ARRANGE TO MAKE RESTITUTION FOR THE ITEMS THEY HAVE PILFERED OR DESTROYED. THE EFFORT TO TEACH THE YOUTH TO ACCEPT THE CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR ACTS CANNOT HELP BUT FAIL, IF THE YOUTH BELIEVE THE WORKER TO BE AN "INFORMER" AND A PERSON THAT CANNOT BE TRUSTED.¹⁶

WHILE THE OFFICIAL POLICIES OF BOTH GROUPS SEEM TO DOVETAIL NICELY, THE REALITY WAS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT. "THE AVERAGE COP OR DETECTIVE BELIEVED THAT THE STREETWORKERS WERE COVERING UP FOR THEIR KIDS", ACCORDING TO FORMER SERGEANT GARLAND DAVIS, HEAD OF THE FIRST GANG INTELLIGENCE UNIT.¹⁷ SOME WOULD PUMP THE WORKERS FOR ALL OF THE

INFORMATION THEY COULD GET. A FEW STREETWORKERS RESPONDED BY CLAMMING UP ENTIRELY. THE CHICAGO YOUTH CENTERS REFUSED TO DIVULGE ANY INFORMATION TO THE POLICE SAVE FOR VERY EXCEPTIONAL CASES.¹³ THEY WOULD NOT EVEN DIVULGE THE ADDRESS OR PHONE OF ONE OF THEIR STREET CLUB MEMBERS.

NONETHELESS, THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL OF COOPERATION IN ORDER TO PREVENT VIOLENCE. THIS COOPERATION DID NOT MATERIALLY HINDER THE STREETWORKERS RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS GANG IN SPITE OF ITS GREAT POTENTIAL FOR DOING SO. AS LONG AS THE WORKER MADE HIS POLICY CLEAR AT THE INITIATION OF HIS RELATIONSHIP TO A STREET CLUB, HIS ACTIONS WERE USUALLY ACCEPTED BY THE GROUP. HE WAS FREQUENTLY TESTED ON HIS COMMITMENT TO THE POLICY OF "DIME DROPPING" AND IT WAS OFTEN DIFFICULT TO DISTINGUISH TALL TALES FROM THE TRUTH, BUT HE USUALLY MANAGED TO BRING IT OFF.

THE MOST BASIC PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFERENCE ABOUT THE REDUCTION OF YOUTH CRIME DID NOT DIVIDE ALONG POLICE-STREETWORKER LINES. THE PREFERENCE FOR CRIME PREVENTION RATHER THAN CRIME CONTROL WAS SHARED BY THE STREETWORKERS AND THE POLICE JUVENILE BUREAU WHILE MOST OTHER POLICEMEN OPPOSED IT. THOUGH THIS DIALECTIC MAY APPEAR TO BE ANOTHER NAME FOR REHABILITATION-PUNISHMENT, IT ACTUALLY GOES MUCH DEEPER. PREVENTION OR CONTROL IS PREFERRED DEPENDING ON A VIEW OF CRIME AS ORIGINATING IN THE INDIVIDUAL OR IN THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT'S EFFECT ON THE INDIVIDUAL. THE ADVOCATE OF CRIME PREVENTION VIEWS CRIME AS A RESULT OF PATHOLOGY; THE ADVOCATE OF CONTROL VIEWS CRIME AS A RESULT OF MORALITY.¹⁴

THE EXPONENTS OF THE TWO PHILOSOPHIES COMPETED WITH EACH OTHER USING THE SAME CLIENT POPULATION, IN THE EFFORT TO PROVE THE VERITY OF THEIR RESPECTIVE PHILOSOPHIES, THERE WAS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CONFLICT. THE YOUTH DIVISION, IN ITS "EFFORT TO KEEP JUVENILES OUT OF JAIL RATHER THAN IN"^{2c} OFTEN EARNED THE NICKNAMES OF "DIAPER DICKS" OR " KIDDIE COPS" FROM THE REST OF THE FORCE.²¹ WHILE THE STREETWORKERS DIFFERED WITH THE YOUTH DIVISION ON THE VALUE OF YOUTH GANGS,²¹ STREETWORKERS HAD MUCH BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE YOUTH DIVISION THAN WITH THE REST OF THE FORCE. IN FACT, THE YOUTH OFFICERS ASKED THAT THE STREETWORKERS AVOID CONTACT WITH THE REGULAR POLICE.

IN 1954 MICHAEL DELANEY BECAME DIRECTOR OF THE JUVENILE BUREAU OF THE CRIME PREVENTION DIVISION. PRIOR TO HIS TAKING OVER, THE BUREAU HAD BEEN A DUMPING GROUND FOR OLDER COPS WHO COULDN'T BE USED ELSEWHERE. THEY CONFINED THEMSELVES MOSTLY TO PROCESSING JUVENILES ARRESTED BY THE REGULAR BEAT PATROLMEN. DELANEY RECRUITED MEN WITH A BACKGROUND IN SOCIAL SCIENCE AND AN INTEREST IN YOUTH. HE ESTABLISHED THE APPROACH OF WORKING WITH JUVENILES IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR FAMILY STRUCTURE. HE BEGAN REFERRING APPREHENDED MISDEMEANANTS TO SOCIAL AGENCIES FOR COUNSELING. HE REALIZED THE FUTILITY OF SENDING JUVENILES TO OVERCROWDED PRISONS WHICH ONLY BRED HOSTILITY, AND SUCH ACTION WAS ONLY RECOMMENDED TO THE FAMILY COURT AS A LAST RESORT.²³

IN SPITE OF THE UNPOPULARITY OF THIS APPROACH AMONG THE OTHER POLICE OFFICERS, THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR IT. AS THE EFFORTS OF THE STREETWORKERS AND THE YOUTH DIVISION TO PREVENT JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ATTRACTED MEDIA ATTENTION, THEY GAINED IN PUBLIC APPROVAL, THAT IS, APPROVAL BY THE INTERESTED PUBLIC. THE PHILANTHROPIC ELITES AND THE COMMUNITIES PLAGUED BY DELINQUENCY BOTH FOUND HOPE IN THE PREVENTIVE APPROACH.²⁴

A RESULT OF THE FIRST YEARS OF TRIAL AND EXPERIMENTATION, THE COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR STREET WORK WAS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT INDEPENDENT VARIABLE WHICH AFFECTED POLICE-STREET WORK RELATIONS DURING THE EARLY NINETEEN SIXTIES. THE NEXT SECTION WILL TRY TO EXAMINE THE IMPACT OF THAT SUPPORT IN THE CONTEXT OF A CHANGING POLITICAL CLIMATE AND A NEW POLICE SUPERINTENDENT.

YEARS OF SUPPORT: 1961-66

AS THE EISENHOWER YEARS ENDED AND THE KENNEDY YEARS BEGAN, THE EFFORT TO FIGHT JUVENILE DELINQUENCY MOVED UP ON THE SCALE OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES. THERE DEVELOPED A NATIONAL SENSE OF AWARENESS FOR THIS PROBLEM, AN AWARENESS WHICH PRODUCED SUPPORT FOR ANTI-DELINQUENCY PROGRAMS. WHAT THIS MEANT FOR CHICAGO'S PRIVATE SOCIAL AGENCIES WAS THAT STREETWORK COULD BE DONE ON A LARGER SCALE WITH MORE SOPHISTICATION THAN HAD BEEN POSSIBLE BEFORE. THE CATALYST FOR TRANSFORMING THIS NEW SUPPORT INTO EXPANDED PROGRAMMING WAS, OF COURSE, MONEY.

AT THE CLOSE OF THE HARD-TO-REACH YOUTH PROJECT, MOST OF THE PARTICIPATING AGENCIES GAVE UP THEIR STREET WORK PROGRAMS. THE STRAIN ON ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES HAD MADE CONTINUATION IMPRACTICAL. THE AGENCIES THAT CONTINUED THE PROGRAMS COMPETED FOR FEDERAL AND FOUNDATION FUNDING AND PRIVATE CONTRIBUTIONS. THE BOY'S CLUB, CHICAGO YOUTH DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CYDP) WAS THE MOST SUCCESSFUL, IN THAT COMPETITION, ATTRACTING A MULTI-MILLION DOLLAR FORD FOUNDATION GRANT FOR A SIX YEAR INTENSIVE ACTION-RESEARCH PROGRAM ON THE NEAR WEST SIDE. THE YMCA ATTRACTED A SMALLER FORD GRANT (\$106,000).²⁵ THE CHICAGO YOUTH CENTERS AND SOME OF THE SETTLEMENT HOUSES CONTINUED STREET WORK WITH THEIR REGULAR FUNDING.

THIRTY EIGHT STREET WORKERS HAD BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE EARLY HARD TO REACH YOUTH PROJECT. BY THE TIME THE NEW PROGRAMS WERE UNDERWAY, OVER ONE HUNDRED MEN AND WOMEN WERE ON THE STREETS OF

CHICAGO'S POVERTY AREAS. THE WORKERS WERE STILL PRIMARILY UNDER THIRTY, UNMARRIED, AND ATHLETICALLY PROFICIENT. TWO THIRDS OF THEM WERE IN DIGENOUS TO THEIR TARGET COMMUNITIES; ONE-THIRD WERE OUTSIDERS, GENERALLY WHITE. MOST WERE WORKING 5.5 DAY WEEKS; 4-12 P.M. ON WEEKDAYS PLUS SATURDAY EVENINGS. THE LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT STILL AVEREGED ABOUT TWO YEARS FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL WORKER.

THE POSTURE OF STREET WORK TOWARDS LAW -ENFORCEMENT DID NOT SEEM TO HAVE BEEN CHANGED, EITHER, AS THIS YMCA POLICY STATEMENT INDICATES;

FROM ITS INCEPTION THE PROGRAM HAS FORMALY RECOGNIZED THE VALUE OF THE POLICE FUNCTION IN THESE COMMUNITIES, AND HAS DEVOTED CONSIDERABLE EFFORT TO EDUCATING THE POLICE ON THE LEGITIMACY OF THE DETACHED WORKER FUNCTION. AT THE SAME TIME DETACHED WORKERS HAVE IMPRESSED THEIR GROUPS WITH THE NECESSITY OF LEGAL PROCESS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT. IT IS BELIEVED THAT EFFECTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT PLACES CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE ON THE DELINQUENT GANG ACTIVITY, AND THEREBY ADDS APPRICIABLE VALUE TO THE ALTERNATIVE OFFERED BY THE PROGRAM.²⁶

ALTHOUGH STREETWORK HAD CHANGED LITTLE IN SUBSTANCE FROM 1959 TO 1966, THE CHANGE IN SHEER VOLUME ALONE MADE MANY MORE POLICEMEN AWARE OF STREET WORKERS WITH INCREASED FREQUENCY OF CONTACT. SUCH INTERACTION INVOLVED ALL OF THE PROBLEMS DISCUSSED IN THE LAST SECTION, AT A TIME WHEN THE FORCE WAS EVEN LESS ABLE TO COPE WITH THOSE PROBLEMS. THE LEVELS OF INSUCURITY AND UNCERTAINTY AMONG THE CHICAGO POLICE WERE HIGHER THEN BEFORE,²⁷ SO ONE WOULD SUSPECT THAT THE STREETWORKERS WOULD POSE EVEN MORE OF A THREAT TO POLICE AND RECEIVE MORE HOSTILE TREATMENT. IN FACT, THE RELATIONS IMPROVED SOMEWHAT.

IN 1960 MAYOR RICHARD DALEY IMPORTED ORLANDO W. WILSON, DEAN OF THE SCHOOL OF CRIMINOLOGY AT BERKELEY AND FORMER CHIEF OF POLICE IN KANSAS CITY, TO TAKE OVER THE SCANDAL-RIDDEN CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT. HE BROUGHT TECHNOLOGY AND PROFESSIONALIZATION TO A FORCE WHICH WAS UNSURE OF THE VALUE OF THE CHANGES AND UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE IMPACT WHICH THE CHANGES WOULD HAVE ON THEIR CAREERS:

IN 1960, AS THE NEW SUPERINTENDENT, O.W. WILSON, ASSUMED HIS DUTIES POLICE MORALE WAS VERY POOR ... AND THE FORCE SENSED, RIGHTLY, THAT MANY CITIZENS HELD THEM IN CONTEMPT.²⁸

AFTER YEARS OF STAGNATION (UNDER THE CONTROL OF A CLIQUE OF POWERFUL SENIOR CAPTAINS) AND WITH *promotions came suddenly for many* DIZZYING SPEED FOR A SELECT FEW. ²⁹ THUS, IN THE INFORMAL AS WELL AS FORMAL ASPECTS OF DEPARTMENTAL AFFAIRS, CHANGE AND UNCERTAINTY WERE RAMPANT.³⁰

AN EXAMPLE OF THE "NEW BREED" UNDER WILSON WAS CAPTAIN JOHN HARTNETT. HE JOINED THE FORCE IN 1949 BUT WAS NOT PROMOTED TO SERGEANT UNTIL WILSON CAME IN 1960, IN SPITE OF HIS THREE YEARS OF COLLEGE. HE BECAME A LIEUTENANT IN 1961, A CAPTAIN IN 1964, AND A DISTRICT COMMANDER IN 1963.³⁰ ON THE OTHER HAND, VETERAN COMMANDER WALTER SHANAHAN WAS DEMOTED FOR "FAILURE TO CONTROL VICE IN HIS AREA".³¹

CYDP YOUTH WORKERS OBSERVED A GROWING GENERATION GAP WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT DURING THE FIRST FOUR YEARS OF WILSON'S ADMINISTRATION.³² THE YOUNGER OFFICERS SEEMED MORE OPEN TO THE STREET WORK APPROACH THAN THE OLDER ONES, THOUGH REACTIONS COULD NOT ALWAYS BE PREDICTED BY AGE. THE OLDER ONES THOUGH, FELT MORE THREATENED BY THE NEW POLICE SUPERINTENDENT.

THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ASPECT OF THE WILSON REORGANIZATION WAS THE PROMOTION OF MICHAEL DELANEY TO HEAD THE CRIME PREVENTION DIVISION. DELANEY'S PROMOTION INSURED A SOURCE OF STRENGTH FOR HIS ATTITUDE TOWARDS YOUTH WORKERS. NOT ONLY WERE YOUTH OFFICERS UNDER PRESSURE TO COOPERATE WITH STREET WORKERS, BUT DELANEY'S POSITION SEEMED TO CREATE PRESSURE ON THE REST OF THE DEPARTMENT.

THE PUBLIC RHETORIC AGAINST VIOLENT GANGS WAS MAINTAINED. A GANG INTELLIGENCE UNIT WAS FORMED IN 1961 TO "GATHER INFORMATION ABOUT YOUTH GANGS, THEIR LEADERSHIP, ACTIVITIES, MEETING PLACES, AND CRIMINAL PURPOSES, IF ANY".³³ HOWEVER, THE UNIT WAS HEADED BY SERGEANT GARLAND DAVIS, THE BEST-LIKED (BY STREET WORKERS) COP ON THE FORCE. IN FACT, SOME OF THE INFORMATION HE GATHERED DISPROVED CERTAIN POLICE NOTIONS ABOUT GANGS AND UPSET SOME OFFICERS IN THE DEPARTMENT.³⁴

AFTER A VIOLENT SUMMER IN 1960, O.W. WILSON ISSUED ORDERS THAT "THE GANGS MUST BE CRUSHED".³⁵ JUDGE SAUL ETON BEGAN ISSUING MAXIMUM SENTENCES FOR SERIOUS OFFENSES, BUT THE GET-TOUGH CAMPAIGN SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN SHORT-LIVED. INDEED THE SITUATION SEEMED TO BE SO WELL IN HAND THAT BY 1962 CAPTAIN DELANEY SAID THAT THE "RUMBLE TYPE OF GANG BATTLE IS A THING OF THE PAST IN CHICAGO".³⁶

THE OPINION THAT STREET WORKERS HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE APPARENT REDUCTION IN GANG VIOLENCE SEEMED TO FILTER UP TO CITY HALL. IN SPITE OF SOME OBJECTION TO THE YMCA CONSULTANT PROJECT (WHEREBY GANG LEADERS WERE PAID SMALL MONTHLY SALARIES TO ASSIST THE STREET WORKERS), THE STREET WORK PROGRAMS HAD THE SANCTION OF THE MAYOR'S OFFICE.

MANY OF THE BOARD MEMBERS OF THE WELFARE AGENCIES WIELDED POLITICAL CLOUT, A FACTOR CONTRIBUTING TO THE SANCTION. JIM RUTHERFORD, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS THE MAYOR'S CAMPAIGN MANAGER AND A TOP YMCA LAYMAN. FURTHER, THE CO-OPTATION OF GANG LEADERS TO AN ESTABLISHMENT ORIENTATION SEEMED LIKE A PERFECTLY RATIONAL PROGRAM.

WHILE APPROVAL FROM THE TOP DID KEEP POLICE RELATIONS WITH STREET WORKERS FROM GREAT HOSTILITY DURING A PERIOD OF POLICE STRESS, IT DID NOT INSURE FRATERNAL LOVE OF EACH GROUP FOR THE OTHER. THE OFFICIAL POLICY TOWARDS YOUTH WORKERS HAD AS MUCH IMPACT ON THE STREET-LEVEL POLICE BUREAUCRACY AS ANY POLICY WOULD HAVE WHICH RAN COUNTER TO POLICE ATTITUDES. CITY HALL SUPPORT FOR STREET WORK IMPOSED A CERTAIN RESTRAINT ON POLICE BEHAVIOR. HOWEVER, THE CHARACTER OF POLICE-STREETWORKER INTERACTIONS WAS AFFECTED MORE BY THE IMMEDIATE CIRCUMSTANCES THAN BY THE MAYOR'S ATTITUDE.

THE DETACHED WORKERS THEMSELVES MADE A GREATER EFFORT THAN BEFORE TO ACHIEVE POSITIVE POLICE RELATIONS. THE C.Y.D.P. AND THE YMCA BOTH USED THE FOLLOWING KIND OF GUIDELINES:

1. WHEN YOU BEGIN WORK IN AN AREA WHICH IS NEW TO YOU, PAY A VISIT TO THE DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS, MEET AND GET TO KNOW THE COMMANDER.

2. SUGGEST THAT YOU BE INTRODUCED TO THE OFFICERS OF THE

DISTRICT AT ONE OF THE POLICE ROLL CALLS.

3. ON THE STREET, KNOW THE PATROLMEN AND THE PATROL CARS.

4. IN DEALING WITH THE POLICE, DON'T CHALLENGE THEM; TRY NOT TO THREATEN THEIR POSITION OR AUTHORITY.

a. IF THE GROUP YOU ARE WITH IS APPROACHED BY THE POLICE, IMMEDIATELY IDENTIFY YOURSELF AS A WORKER AND LET THE POLICE TAKE THE INITIATIVE. DON'T ALLOW YOURSELF TO BE PUT IN THE MIDDLE.

b. IF YOU THINK THE POLICEMAN IS WRONG, SAY SO BRIEFLY AND CALMLY AND STATE YOUR POSITION. IF HIS RESPONSE IS NEGATIVE, WAIT UNTIL A LATER TIME TO PURSUE THE ISSUE, I.E., ASIDE FROM THE GROUP, AT THE POLICE STATION OR WITH THE COMMANDER.

5. WHEN YOU VISIT A POLICE STATION TO SEE ABOUT YOUR BOYS, BE COOL. 37

THERE WERE SOME OBSTACLES TO REALIZING THE FULL EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS "GETTING TO KNOW YOU" APPROACH. HANS MATTICK, DIRECTOR OF THE CYDP, HAS POINTED OUT THAT THE STREET PATROLMEN WORKED ON THREE DIFFERENT SHIFTS WITH STEADILY CHANGING GEOGRAPHIC ASSIGNMENTS (BEATS) FOR EACH OFFICER. THE FLUIDITY OF THE ASSIGNMENTS MADE PERMANENT RELATIONSHIPS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE BETWEEN STREET WORKERS AND PATROLMEN. PERMANENT RELATIONS WERE ESTABLISHED ONLY WITH YOUTH OFFICERS, WHO TENDED TO SPEND MOST OF THEIR TIME IN THE OFFICE DOING CASE WORK AND RECORD KEEPING. HENCE, YOUTH OFFICERS WERE NOT THE POLICEMEN PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING DECISIONS ABOUT WHICH JUVENILES TO ARREST. 38

ONE STREET PATROLMEN DID MANAGE TO ESTABLISH PERMANENT RELATIONS

WITH STREET WORKERS BUT THE EFFECTS WERE HARDLY POSITIVE.

JAMES B. ("GLOVES") DAVIS EARNED HIS NICKNAME BY WEARING A GLOVE ON HIS RIGHT HAND, AN AFFECTATION WHICH SOME SAY FACILITATED HIS BEATINGS OF JUVENILES. DAVIS, A BLACK, WAS LATER INVOLVED IN THE PRE-DAWN RAID ON BLACK PANTHER FRED HAMPTON'S APARTMENT, AND ONE OF HIS VICTIMS HAS BEEN AWARDED \$4,800 DAMAGES FOR AN ALLEGED PISTOL-WHIPPING.³⁹ AS A WEST SIDE PATROLMAN IN THE EARLY SIXTIES, THOUGH, HIS NOTORIETY WAS JUST BEGINNING.

AFTER SEVERAL BAD INCIDENTS WITH "GLOVES" DAVIS (NOT TO BE CONFUSED WITH GARLAND DAVIS, THE BLACK, ENLIGHTENED HEAD OF THE GANG INTELLIGENCE UNIT), ERNIE JENKINS, A CHICAGO YOUTH CENTERS (CYC) STREET WORKER, COMPILED A REPORT ON DAVIS AFTER DISCUSSING THE MATTER WITH CYC DIRECTOR RUSSELL HOGREFE, THEY BOTH MET WITH ONE OF THE POLICE SUPERINTENDENT WILSON'S YOUNG ASSISTANTS. ALL THREE THEN MET WITH THE SUPREINTENDENT TO DISCUSS THE CHARGES AGAINST DAVIS. SHORTLY THEREAFTER "GLOVES" DAVIS WAS TRANSFERRED OUT OF LAWDALE TO ANOTHER DISTRICT.⁴⁰

SIMILAR CASES WERE MORE OFTEN RESOLVED BY STARTING LOWER DOWN IN POLICE CHANNELS, USUALLY WITH THE DISTRICT COMMANDER. ONE COMMANDER TOLD A GROUP OF YMCA DETACHED WORKERS:

- 20 -

WHEN YOU HAVE ANY LEGITIMATE COMPLAINTS, BRING THEM TO ME IMMEDIATELY. YOU DON'T HAVE TO SEE THE DESK SERGEANT OR MY SECRETARY, COME DIRECTLY TO ME WITH THE FACTS. LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT I WILL MAKE A THOROUGH AND IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION AND WE WILL DEAL VERY HARSHLY WITH ANY POLICEMAN WHO IS WRONG. 41

SUCH HANDLING IS MORE INDICATIVE OF THE OFFICIAL ATTITUDE DISCUSSED EARLIER THAN IT IS OF THE REALITY OF STREET-LEVEL INTERACTIONS. AN IMPRESSION CAN BE GLEANED FROM INTERVIEWS (WITH MEN WHO WERE EITHER POLICE OFFICERS OR STREET WORKERS IN THE EARLY SIXTIES) WHICH MAY BE CLOSER TO THAT REALITY THAN ANY PARTICULAR INCIDENT COULD INDICATE. STREET WORKERS TENDED TO BE MOSTLY OPEN TO POLICE FRIENDSHIP WITH A FEW EXCEPTIONS OF OPEN HOSTILITY. THE POLICE HAD A FEW EXCEPTIONS WHO WERE OPEN TO YOUTH WORKER FRIENDSHIPS, A FEW EXCEPTIONS WHO WERE BRUTALLY HOSTILE TO WORKERS, AND GREAT MAJORITY WHO VIEWED THE YOUTH WORKER AS A "PAIN IN THE ASS." THE YOUTH WORKER WAS JUST ONE MORE OBSTACLE IN THE HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT WITH WHICH THE POLICEMAN HAD TO DEAL.

FOR EXAMPLE, RICHARD BOOGE, FORMER CYDP WORKER AND PRESENT DIRECTOR OF THE YMCA'S NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER FOR OUTREACH WORKERS, TALKS OF THE EARLY SIXTIES AS A GOLDEN AGE OF POLICE RELATIONS. HE NOTES THE INFLUENCE OF GARLAND DAVIS AND MIKE DELANEY ON SOME

POLICE OFFICERS, INCREASING THE WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS WITH YOUTH WORKERS THE ALTERNATIVES FOR DEALING WITH INDIVIDUAL GANG MEMBERS. NONETHELESS, THE AVERAGE COP ON THE BEAT WAS ALWAYS "ON THE BACK" OF A YOUTH WORKER, "MIDDLING" HIM BETWEEN POLICE ATTITUDES AND DELINQUENT SUBCULTURAL ATTITUDES SO THAT HIS STAND BETWEEN THE POLES BECAME TENUOUS.⁴²

EACH OF THE THREE MAIN YOUTH AGENCIES HAD DIFFERENT EXPERIENCES. THERE WAS A CORRELATION BETWEEN THE AMOUNT OF MONEY EACH AGENCY HAD AND THE QUALITY OF POLICE RELATIONS, BUT MONEY WAS NOT THE DETERMINING FACTOR. DRESS STYLES, APPROACH TO THE GANGS, ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY AND PUBLIC RELATIONS WERE ALSO IMPORTANT FACTORS.

THE CYDP WAS ENTIRELY INDEPENDENT FINANCIALLY, SO IT HAD NO NEED TO PROMULGATE A PUBLIC IMAGE. ITS SCOPE WAS GEOGRAPHICALLY LIMITED AND ITS STAFF WAS HIGHLY "PROFESSIONALIZED". ALL OF THEIR STREET WORKERS WERE COLLEGE GRADUATES WHO WORE COATS AND TIES. THEY WERE ASSIGNED TO A SPECIFIC AREA, NOT TO A GROUP. THEY COOPERATED WITH THE POLICE ON AN EXTENSIVE REFERRAL PROJECT WHICH THEY REALLY DID NOT WANT TO BOTHER WITH (ALL ARRESTED YOUTHS HAD THEIR FILES SENT TO CYDP FOR FOLLOW-UP). ALL OF THIS SOMEHOW PRODUCED "EXCEPTIONALLY GOOD POLICE RELATIONS."⁴³

THE YMCA HAD TO RAISE MONEY ON AN ANNUAL BASIS FOR STREET WORK PROGRAMS, SO THEY DID PROMULGATE A PUBLIC IMAGE. AS ONE Y WORKER PUT IT, THEY TOLD "WAR STORIES". PRESS ARTICLES AND EVEN A "20th CENTURY" NATIONAL TELEVISION SPECIAL IN 1963 HELPED TO BUILD THE PICTURE OF THE Y FIGHTING CRIME AND HELPING YOUNG MEN. THIS MAY HAVE PRODUCED SOME ENVY IN THE POLICE DEPARTMENT; IN ANY EVENT IT WAS NOT WELL RECEIVED.⁴⁴ YMCA DETACHED WORKERS WERE MOSTLY INDIGENOUS TO THEIR COMMUNITIES, OFTEN EX-GANG MEMBERS WITH SOME COLLEGE TRAINING BUT NOT ALWAYS WITH DEGREES. THEIR WORK WAS GROUP-ORIENTED, NOT AREA-ORIENTED. THEIR IDENTIFICATION WITH THE GROUP EXTENDED TO DRESS, WHICH COMPOUNDED THE POLICE PROBLEM OF RECOGNIZING THE YOUTH WORKERS. ON OCCASION SOME Y WORKERS FOUND THEMSELVES IN JAIL.⁴⁵

THE CHICAGO YOUTH CENTER'S ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY CONTINUED TO PLAGUE ITS POLICE RELATIONS LONG AFTER JAMES HALSELL'S NAME HAD BEEN FORGOTTEN. FOR A TIME AFTER THAT CASE THE ENTIRE FORCE WAS HOSTILE TO THEM. AFTER A PROLONGED SERIES OF DISCUSSION INITIATED BY CYC, THE YOUTH OFFICERS ENTERED INTO A POSITIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE STREET WORKERS. IN SPITE OF THEIR COAT AND TIE APPEARANCE, HOWEVER, CYC WORKERS STILL FARED BADLY IN CONTACTS WITH THE BEAT PATROLMEN.⁴⁶

THE POLICY ON FIREARMS WAS DIFFERENT FOR EACH AGENCY. THE YMCA

GAINED POLICE FAVOR BY CONFISCATING WEAPONS WHENEVER POSSIBLE AND TURNING THEM OVER TO THE YOUTH BUREAU. THE CYDP WORKERS REQUESTED THAT ANY ARMED YOUTH SURRENDER THE WEAPON WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IW WOULD BE DESTROYED IMMEDIATELY, BUT NOT TURNED OVER TO THE POLICE. CYC WORKERS APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN SOMEWHAT MORE FLEXIBLE; WITH A POLICY SIMILAR TO CYDP'S, THEY EMPHASIZED THE YOUTH'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS OWN ACTIONS AND DECISIONS.⁴⁷

ALTHOUGH THESE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE AGENCIES WERE NOT GREAT, THEY WERE SIGNIFICANT. STREET WORKERS FROM DIFFERENT AGENCIES DID NOT OFTEN COME INTO CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER, BUT THERE WAS ENOUGH CONTACT AT ONE POINT TO ENGENDER HOSTILITY SUFFICIENT FOR A FIST FIGHT.⁴⁸ THESE PROBLEMS WERE LARGELY SOLVED IN 1965 BY THE PROSPECT OF ANTI-POVERTY MONEY FOR A UNIFIED STREET WORK PROGRAM. IN MARCH OF 1965 A \$684,984 OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY GRANT WAS APPROVED FOR "STREETS".⁴⁹ IT MAY BE WORTH NOTING THAT THE ASSISTANT TO OEO DIRECTOR SARGENT SHRIVER AT THAT TIME WAS RICHARD BOONE, FORMER HEAD OF THE CHICAGO YMCA PROGRAM FOR DETACHED WORKERS.

"STREETS" (SOCIALIZATION, TRAINING, RECREATION, EDUCATION, AND EMPLOYMENT TECHNICAL SERVICE) IS A PROGRAM WHEREIN FOUR PRIVATE AGENCIES HAVE COME TOGETHER TO AGREE UPON A COMMON PATTERN FOR STAFFING AND FUNDING A UNIT OF SERVICE, AND TO AGREE UPON WHICH OF THE AGENCIES WILL PROVIDE THIS SERVICE IN EACH OF THE POVERTY-LINE COMMUNITY AREAS AS DEFINED BY THE CHICAGO COMMITTEE ON URBAN OPPORTUNITY.⁵⁰

THE COMBINATION APPROACH MADE FISCAL AND MANAGEMENT SENSE. IT REFLECTED THE APEX OF CITY HALL SUPPORT FOR STREET WORK. IT WAS DIRECTED BY A STREET WORKER (ROBERT JEMIDA) WHOSE FATHER AND BROTHER HAD BOTH BEEN HIGH-RANKING POLICEMEN. IT SHOULD HAVE MAINTAINED THE BEST POLICE RELATIONS EVER POSSIBLE, AND IT DID FOR A TIME. INSTEAD, IT BECAME THE HARBINGER OF THE DECLINE IN POLICE RELATIONS AS WELL AS CITY HALL SUPPORT FOR STREET WORK. IT FAILED IN THAT SENSE FOR TWO COMPLEMENTARY REASONS: ITS EXPANDED PURPOSE OF SOCIAL CHANGE AND THE CHANGING SOCIO-POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT.

THE GOAL OF STREET WORK HAD EXPANDED OVER A DECADE FROM REDUCTION OF CRIME TO ADVANCING THE STATUS OF MINORITY GROUPS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY. IT HAD MOVED FROM THE STREET WORKER FINDING A DISHWASHER JOB FOR ONE OF THE GANG MEMBERS TO PLACEMENT OF YOUTH IN SOPHISTICATED REMEDIAL EDUCATION AND JOB TRAINING PROGRAMS. IT HAD EXPANDED FROM DEALING WITH ONLY A FEW GANGS TO PROGRAMS IN ALMOST EVERY POVERTY NEIGHBORHOOD IN CHICAGO. IT HAD BECOME A MAJOR FORCE AGAINST THE STATUS QUO AND WAS THEREFORE SOMEWHAT REVOLUTIONARY.

MIKE DELANEY, STREET WORK'S MAJOR FRIEND IN THE POLICE DEPARTMENT, HAS SAID THAT STREET WORK WAS HURT BY EXPANSION.⁵¹ CHARLES

LIVERMORE, FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE CHICAGO COMMISSION ON YOUTH WELFARE, SAYS THAT STREET WORK KILLED ITSELF BY PUTTING MONEY INTO THE HANDS OF GANG LEADERS (UNDER ITS "CONSULTANT" PROJECT) WHICH MADE GANG LEADING PROFITABLE.⁵² WARDELL HEYWOOD, A VICE PRESIDENT OF THE CHICAGO YMCA, VIEWS BOTH OF THE PREVIOUS STATEMENTS AS CRITICISMS OF THE CHANGED THRUST IN STREET WORK TOWARDS PROVIDING ALTERNATIVES TO GANG VIOLENCE BY ALTERING AND OPENING UP THE LEGITIMATE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE.⁵³

THAT STREET WORK HAD DEFINITELY SHIFTED ITS FOCUS FROM DELINQUENCY REDUCTION TO SOCIAL CHANGE CAN BE SEEN BY A CONFIDENTIAL MEMO FOUND IN THE FILES OF ONE OF THE AGENCIES WHICH ASKED, "WHO AMONG US CAN STATE WITH CERTAINTY THAT A LOWER ARREST RATE IS A GOOD THING?"

THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND BLACK POWER ALSO FATED "STREETS" AS A SOCIAL CHANGE VENTURE WITH ESTABLISHMENT, OR AT LEAST POLICE, SUPPORT. "STREETS" WORKERS WERE PLAGUED BY THOUGHTS ARTICULATED IN AN ANONYMOUS LETTER WHICH MANY OF THEM RECEIVED:

BECAUSE MISTER CHARLIE PAYS YOUR SALARY THE SAME AS HE PAYS ME, ASK YOURSELF, IF THE REAL SHIT BREAKS OUT HERE, WHAT WILL BE MY ROLE?

THE GREAT FEAR AT CITY HALL WAS THAT "STREETS" WOULD CHANNEL GANG MEMBERS INTO THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT. IN FACT, AN OBSERVER AS FAR AWAY AS CALIFORNIA SUSPECTED THAT "STREETS" WOULD DO JUST THAT:

FOR THOSE WORKING IN THE GANG AREAS OF OUR MAJOR CITIES, IT HAS BECOME COMMON TO ATTACH THESE TRENDS TO THE "NATURAL LEADERSHIP POTENTIAL" OF MANY GANG MEMBERS AND DERIVE A SOCIAL ACTION DIRECTION IN WHICH GANG ENERGIES WOULD BE FUNNELED INTO CIVILRIGHTS ACTIVITIES. THE "STREETS" PROJECT IN CHICAGO IS A THINLY GUISED MASSIVE EFFORT IN JUST THIS TRADITION.⁵⁴

FEARING THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A DIRECTION, ROBERT JEMILO, THE HEAD OF "STREETS, PLEADED IN JANUARY OF 1966 FOR NON-INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS:

TO INVOLVE THE "STREETS" PROGRAM IN POLITICS, IN ANY FORM, WOULD BE TO FORCE THE HAND OF SARGENT SHRIVER ... AND THE TOTAL "STREETS" PROGRAM COULD COME TO AN ABRUPT END.⁵⁵

THE EXTENT OF "STREETS" WORKERS OF THEIR GANG MEMBERS INVOLVEMENT IN THE SPRING PRIMARIES OF 1966 WAS UNCLEAR. THE CANDIDACY OF FORMER YMCA DETACHED WORKER FRED HUBBARD (IN OPPOSITION TO THE REGULAR PARTY NOMINEE) PRODUCED ENOUGH APPEARANCE OF INVOLVEMENT TO RESULT IN A TERMINATION OF "STREETS" FUNDING (BY THE CHICAGO ANTI-POVERTY AGENCY, C.C.U.O.) AFTER ONE YEAR OF OPERATION. WITH THAT DECISION, THE YEARS OF SUPPORT WERE OVER.

POLITICS AND HOSTILITY: 1966-70

THE RECENT HISTORY OF YOUTH WORKER-POLICE RELATIONS IN CHICAGO HAS BEEN DOMINATED BY THE RISE OF SUPERGANGS, NOTABLY THE BLACK P. STONE NATION. THE SENSE OF PURPOSE AND LEVEL OF SOPHISTICATION WHICH SUCH GROUPS MANIFESTED NECESSITATED A CHANGE IN THE RELATIONSHIP OF YOUTH WORKERS TO THE GANGS. "JOCKEY-STRAPPING" ATHELETICS AND "BIG BROTHERISM" WERE OUT; PROVISION OF TECHNICAL RESOURCES WAS IN, AS SOPHISTICATION INCREASED THE GANG'S POLITICAL POTENTIAL, THE DEMOCRATIC MACHINE PERCEIVED A THREAT, THE RESPONSE TO WHICH WAS THE EXPANSION OF THE POLICE GANG INTELLIGENCE UNIT. IN THE VIRTUAL STATE OF WARFARE WHICH FOLLOWED THE YOUTH WELFARE INSTITUTIONS WERE FORCED TO STAND ON THE SIDE OF THE GANGS.

THERE ARE THREE COMPETING THEORIES ABOUT THE RISE OF THE SUPER GANGS, THE BLACK P. STONE NATION AND THE DISCIPLES ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF CHICAGO, AND THE CONSERVATIVE MICE LORDS, INC. AND THE COBRAS ON THE WEST SIDE. THE CITY GOVERNMENT ASSERTS THAT THE MONEY GIVEN TO GANGS MADE IT PROFITABLE TO BE A GANG LEADER, SO INTENSIVE RECRUITMENT ON THE BASIS OF THREATS BUILT UP THE GANGS.⁵⁶ UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO CRIMINOLOGIST HANS MATTICK FEELS THAT THE POLICE PRESSURE ON GANGS CREATED SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY, FORCING THE GANGS TO BAND TOGETHER FOR PROTECTION, THOUGH HE DOUBTS THE VALIDITY OF THE SUPER-GANG CONCEPT.⁵⁷ THE YOUTH WELFARE AGENCIES MAINTAIN THAT GANGS SAW THAT IT WAS IN THEIR OWN SELF-INTEREST AND IN THE INTEREST OF THE COMMUNITY TO BAND

TOGETHER. A COROLLARY THEORY IS THAT INTER-GANG WARFARE PRODUCED A SERIES OF ALLIANCES WHICH WERE FOUND TO BE USEFUL FOR PURPOSES OTHER THAN COMBAT.

IN ANY CASE, A VERY UNUSUAL SOCIAL PHENOMENA DID OCCUR. URBAN AMERICAN YOUTH GANGS HAD ALWAYS BEEN LOCALIZED, TRANSITORY GROUPS OF TEN TO TWENTY-FIVE ADOLESCENTS. SUDDENLY, FAIRLY PERMANENT SOCIAL ORGANIZATION WAS ENVELOPING LARGE GEOGRAPHIC AREAS AND ALLEGEDLY THOUSANDS OF YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN, LED BY OLDER MEN IN THEIR TWENTIES AND THIRTIES. THE COHESIVENESS OF THE ORGANIZATIONS HAS NEVER BEEN CLEAR, BUT THE IMPRESSION OF VAST BLACK MAFIAS WAS SPLASHED ACROSS CHICAGO'S NEWSPAPERS.

TERRY MASON, A YOUTH WORKER IN ENGLEWOOD (WEST SIDE) WITH THE DISCIPLES, DESCRIBES A PROCESS HE CALLS CONFEDERATION:

LOTS OF LITTLE STREET CORNER GROUPS BEGAN FORMING TOGETHER. YOU SEE THAT HAPPENING ALSO ON THE CORPORATE SCENE IN LEGITIMATE SOCIETY. I DON'T KNOW WHETHER IT WAS INTUITIVELY OR WHETHER THESE GROUPS HAD DONE THEIR HOMEWORK BUT THEY BEGAN FOLLOWING THE SAME PATTERN AND THERE WERE SOME VERY SIGNIFICANT MERGERS. AS THESE MERGERS CAME ABOUT, THE LEADERSHIP OF THE CORPORATION BECAME MORE AND MORE POWERFUL, THEIR IMPACT BECAME MORE FOR REACHING, AND THEY WERE PRESUMPTUOUS ENOUGH TO CALL THEMSELVES A NATION.⁵⁸

JOHN FRY, PASTOR OF FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH ON THE SOUTH SIDE IN WOODLAWN, SAW MORE THAN JUST A PROCESS OF MERGERS. "AT SOME TIME IN THE HISTORY OF THE RANGERS," HE SAID IN A STATEMENT TO HIS CONGREGATION, "THE CORE BLACKSTONE CLUB BEGAN ORGANIZING CLUBS IN WOODLAWN, THAT IS, BEGAN THE BUSINESS OF CREATING CLUBS WHERE NONE HAD BEEN BEFORE AND CREATING THEM AS RANGER CLUBS."

EQUALLY IMPORTANT AS THE SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF THE NEW SUPER-GANGS WAS THE NEW SENSE OF PURPOSE. THE VIOLENT DELINQUENCY WAS STILL A PART OF GANG LIFE, BUT THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT TREND

TOWARDS SELF-IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. THE CONSERVATIVE VICE LORDS (CVL), CLAIMING 8,000 MEMBERS IN 26 DIVISIONS, WAS INCORPORATED BY THE STATE OF ILLINOIS IN 1967 AS A NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION. IN APRIL, 1968, CVL RECEIVED \$30,000 IN GRANTS FROM THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION AND OPERATION BOOTSTRAP, A "GRASSROOTS GHETTO GROUP." THE MONEY WENT TO SUPPORT A RESTAURANT, AN AFRICAN HERITAGE SHOP, TWO RECREATION CENTERS, A TENANTS RIGHTS GROUP AND A SUMMER BEAUTIFICATION PROJECT.⁵⁹ THE WOODLAWN ORGANIZATION (TWO) RECEIVED A \$927,341 O.E.O. GRANT FOR A ONE-YEAR JOB TRAINING PROGRAM WHICH WAS LARGELY OPERATED BY THE BLACK P. STONES.⁶⁰

THE NEW STYLE IN GANGS MEANT A NEW STYLE IN GANG WORK WAS A PREREQUISITE. S, T, R, E, E, T, S, THE LOOSE STREET WORK CONFEDERATION WHICH WAS KILLED BY LOCAL ANTI-POVERTY AGENCY, BECAME A "COMPLETE AMALGAMATION OF ALL STREET WORK PROGRAMS" IN JANUARY OF 1967 UNDER THE NAME OF "YOUTH ACTION." THE STATED PURPOSE OF THE NEW STRUCTURE WAS TO 1) ELIMINATE DUPLICATION OF ADMINISTRATION, 2) INCREASE COMMUNICATION AND 3) PROVIDE MORE EFFECTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF COMMUNITY AND GANG PROBLEMS. THE EFFECT WAS THAT, FOR THE FIRST TIME, ALL OF THE STREET WORKERS WERE USING ALMOST IDENTICAL APPROACHES TO GANGS WITH VERY SIMILAR RESPONSES TO SITUATIONS INVOLVING POLICE.

THE NEW STRUCTURE HAD TO TAKE A RADICALLY NEW APPROACH TO GANGS. IN 1962 A BUSINESS MAGAZINE HAD DESCRIBED THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE YOUGH WORKER AND THE GANG:

HIS MAIN TARGET IS THE NATURAL LEADERSHIP OF THE GANG. ONCE HE ATTAINS THE STATUS OF FRIEND, CONFIDANT, AND ADVISOR, HE CAN EXERT A GREAT DEAL OF MORAL SUASION TO KEEP THE GANG OUT OF TROUBLE. HE MAY EVEN WORK TO SEPARATE THE LEADERSHIP FROM THE GANG, BECAUSE EXPERIENCE INDICATES THIS TENDS TO CAUSE THE GANG TO LOSE ITS FOCAL POINT AND COHESIVENESS AND IT OFTEN DISINTEGRATES.⁶¹

FIVE YEARS LATER THE GANG LEADERSHIP WAS SOPHISTICATED ENOUGH TO FEAR THE POTENTIAL CHALLENGE OF THE YOUTH WORKERS TO THE LEADERS' AUTHORITY. IN THE GRAND BOULEVARD AREA, FOR EXAMPLE, THE STONES LEADERS "PERSUADED" THEIR MEMBERS WITH THREATS TO STOP FREQUENTING A YOUTH WORK OUTPOST.⁶² CHARLES LIVERMORE, THEN DIRECTOR OF THE CHICAGO COMMISSION ON YOUTH WELFARE (SAID BY SOME TO HAVE BEEN AN ARM OF THE POLICE), FEELS THAT THE PRESTIGE OF THE YOUTH WORKER DECLINED AS THE PRESTIGE OF THE GANG LEADER INCREASED. AS THE YOUTH WELFARE INSTITUTIONS LEGITIMIZED THE GANG LEADERS AND OBTAINED FOUNDATION AND GOVERNMENT MONEY, LIVERMORE FEELS THAT STREET WORKERS DESTROYED THEIR OWN BASE.

THE WELFARE INSTITUTIONS AGREE SOMEWHAT WITH THAT ANALYSIS, BUT THEY MAINTAIN THAT THE CHANGING ROLE WAS INTENTIONAL. AS THE GROUPS BECAME LESS WILLING TO COOPERATE WITH SOCIAL WORK AGENCIES, THE "INTERVENTION AND REDIRECTION" STYLE HAD TO BE DROPPED IN FAVOR OF RESOURCE PROVISION AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.⁶³ THERE WAS COMPETITION WITH OTHER SOCIALLY-CONCERNED ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE PRIVILEGE OF WORKING WITH GANGS. IN DEALING WITH LEGITIMATE ORGANIZATIONS THE GANGS FELT THAT "THE NAME OF THE GAME WAS WHO CAN DELIVER THE MOST BREAD," ACCORDING TO YMCA PRESIDENT JOHN ROOT.

THE GOAL OF STREET WORK SUBSEQUENTLY BECAME WORKING WITH INDIVIDUAL KIDS AND MAINTAINING A NON-COMPETITIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GANG LEADERSHIP, ACCORDING TO ROOT. THE EMPHASIS WAS STILL ON OPENING THE LEGITIMATE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE TO GANG KIDS; LITERALLY THOUSANDS OF YOUNGSTERS WERE BROUGHT INTO THE WORKING WORLD THROUGH THE YMCA HIGH SCHOOL (FOR DROPOUTS) AND COMMUNITY COLLEGE AND THE JOBS (JOB OPPORTUNITIES WITH BUSINESS SKILLS) PROGRAM. THE FOUNDER OF THE CONSERVATIVE VICE LORDS,

EDWARD PERRY, EVEN WOUND UP AT DARTMOUTH.⁶⁴

WHILE SIPHONING OFF MANY YOUTHS FROM THE GANG STRUCTURE WITH SUCH EMPLOYEE-ORIENTED PROGRAMS, YOUTH ACTION ALSO MOVED TO STRENGTHEN THE GANG STRUCTURE BY ASSISTING EMPLOYER-ORIENTED PROGRAMS, i.e., GANG-OPERATED GHETTO BUSINESSES. FOR EXAMPLE, YOUTH ACTION ACTS AS THE FISCAL AGENT FOR THE BUSINESS OPERATIONS OF THE CONSERVATIVE VICE LORDS (MENTIONED EARLIER) AND THE COBRAS (WHO RUN A STANDARD OIL STATION.)⁶⁵

THE YOUTH WORKERS ALSO ACTED TO STRENGTHEN THE GANG STRUCTURE BY ACTING AS "ENVANGELISTS" FOR GANGS, EXPLAINING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL NEEDS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GANGS. "TEN YEARS AGO, STREET WORKERS HAD ONLY TO EXPLAIN THE EXISTENCE OF GANGS AND THE NEED FOR PROGRAMS SPECIFICALLY GEARED FOR YOUTH GANG MEMBERS, TO SECURE SUPPORT," ACCORDING TO CHARLES CURRY, DIRECTOR OF YOUTH ACTION. "TODAY, THE STREET WORKER MUST FIGHT ENTRENCHED OPPOSITION TO THE VERY EXISTENCE OF GANGS."⁶⁶

JOINING IN THIS ENVANGELIZING, NOT UNEXPECTEDLY, WERE SEVERAL CHURCH GROUPS. THEY BECAME INVOLVED WITH GANGS IN A MANNER SIMILAR TO THE NEW STYLE OF YOUTH ACTION. HAROLD WALKER, ASSOCIATE PASTOR OF THE CHURCH MOST PUBLICLY INVOLVED WITH GANGS, FIRST PRESBYTERIAN, DESCRIBED THE WORK OF THE CHURCH WITH THE STONES AS "HELPING THE LEADERSHIP TO GET ACCURATE READINGS OF SITUATIONS." IT IS AS DIFFICULT FOR GHETTO YOUTH TO UNDERSTAND THE SUBTLETIES OF THE OUTSIDE WORLD AS IT IS FOR WHITE MEN TO UNDERSTAND THE GHETTO; THE CHURCH STAFF TRIED TO ACT AS A CLARIFYING RESOURCE. CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY AND THE HYDE PARK MENNONITE CHURCH ALSO BECAME INVOLVED IN GANG WORK, AS WELL AS THE WOODLAWN ORGANIZATION, THE KENWOOD-OAKLAND-COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION, AND OPERATION BOOTSTRAP.

THE STYLE OF GANG WORK WHICH CITY HALL HAD SUPPORTED WAS BASICALLY CO-OPTATION AND REDIRECTION OF GANG ENERGIES INTO ATHLETIC AND EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES. THE NEW STYLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION SMACKED OF "COMMUNITY POWER" AND WAS, THEREFORE, FRAUGHT WITH POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. THE MASSIVE GROWTH OF GANGS UNDER STRONG LEADERSHIP MUST HAVE APPEARED VERY THREATENING. IN PARTICULAR, THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE WOODLAWN ORGANIZATION (WHICH HAD FREQUENTLY OPPOSED AND EMBARRASSED THE MAYOR) AND THE BLACKSTONE NATION WAS VIEWED VERY DIMLY, ACCORDING TO THE FIRST GANG INTELLIGENCE UNIT HEAD, GARLAND DAVIS.⁶⁷

IN SPITE OF THE APPARENT THREAT, THE EVIDENCE WAS THAT THE SUPER-GANGS WERE NOT POLITICALLY ACTIVE IN THEIR EARLY STAGES. IRVING SPERTEL, A PROFESSOR AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SERVICE ADMINISTRATION AND AN AUTHORITY ON GANGS HAS NOTED THE FAILURE OF POLITICAL LEADERS TO REDIRECT INTER-GANG HOSTILITY TO CONTROLLED HOSTILITY AGAINST THE SYSTEM.⁶⁸ THE LEADERS DIDN'T UNDERSTAND GANG PSYCHOLOGY, ACCORDING TO SPERTEL. THE BASICALLY CONSERVATIVE GANG MEMBERS SAW NO INCENTIVE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY.

NEVERTHELESS, THE POTENTIAL FOR SUCH ACTIVITY WAS OBVIOUS AND UNPLEASANT FOR A MAYOR WHO HAD GROWN UP IN A POLITICALLY-ORIENTED GANG CULTURE. REV. FRY'S DESCRIPTION OF A 1966 S.C.L.C. RECRUITMENT MEETING ILLUSTRATES THIS FEAR:

I CONSENTED TO ALLOWING THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE THE USE OF FIRST CHURCH'S JOHN KNOW HALL FOR THE MEETING. S.C.L.C. SHOWED A CBS KINESCOPE OF THE WATTS RIOTS. THE REVEREND JAMES BEVEL FOLLOWED WITH A SPEECH IN WHICH HE ADVOCATED PEACE BETWEEN THE BLACKSTONE RANGERS AND THE DISCIPLES. HE THEN OUTLINED A PROGRAM OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE CALCULATED TO BRING THE CITY OF CHICAGO TO A FULL HALT. MR. BEVEL WAS MORE EXCITED BY HIS PROGRAM THAN THE FOUR HUNDRED RANGERS WHO HAD TURNED

OUT FOR THE MEETING. THE NUMEROUS PLAIN-CLOTHES DETECTIVES PRESENT NOTED THE NONCHALANT RANGER REACTION BUT DUTIFULLY MADE OMINOUS REPORTS OF THE MEETING. SUPERIORS WHO READ THE REPORTS SEEMED TO MINIMIZE THE ACTUAL RANGER REACTION AND TO MAXIMIZE THE THREAT WHICH A COMBINATION OF S.C.L.C. AND THE BLACKSTONE RANGERS POSED TO THE CITY. FROM THAT MOMENT ON, CHICAGO'S OFFICIALDOM WAS DEDICATED TO A POLICY OF FULL HEAT ON THE BLACKSTONE RANGERS.⁶⁹

THE FULL HEAT WAS NOT ON FOR ANOTHER YEAR, HOWEVER. MICHAEL DELANEY WAS STILL HEAD OF THE YOUTH DIVISION AND A FORCE WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT FOR RATIONAL TREATMENT OF YOUTH GANGS. ALTHOUGH THE TASK FORCE (WHICH FUNCTIONS WITHOUT REGARD TO PRECINCT BOUNDARIES) STEPPED ITS HARASSMENT OF GANGS IN 1966, IT WAS NOT UNTIL MARCH OF 1967 THAT DELANEY'S VIEWPOINT WAS REJECTED. AT THAT POINT SUPERINTENDENT WILSON, SOON TO RETIRE, TRANSFERRED THE INTELLIGENCE ARM OF THE YOUTH DIVISION TO THE INTERNAL INVESTIGATION DIVISION AND APPOINTED FLAMBOYANT CAPTAIN EDWARD BUCKNEY TO HEAD UP THE NEW GANG INTELLIGENCE UNIT (GIU). THE GIU HAD A CLEAR MANDATE TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE YOUTH GANG STRUCTURE. THE RETIREMENT OF CAPTAIN MICHAEL DELANEY MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE GIU HAD BECOME THE PRINCIPAL BUREAU FOR YOUTH ACTIVITY IN THE DEPARTMENT.⁷⁰

BUCKNEY HAD SERVED ON THE FORCE FOR FIFTEEN YEARS, DIRECTING TRAFFIC FOR ONE THIRD OF THAT TIME. AFTER FLUNKING THE SERGEANT'S EXAMINATION, HE WAS APPOINTED TO THE SUPERINTENDENT'S STAFF WITH THE TITLE OF TEMPORARY SERGEANT. HE THEN SERVED AS HEAD OF A ROBBERY UNIT, BUT NEVER HAD ANY EXPERIENCE WORKING WITH YOUTH. SUN-TIMES REPORTER FRANCIS WARD HAS AN EXAMINATION FOR BUCKNEY'S APPOINTMENT:

POLITICS, NOT EXPERIENCE, DICTATED BUCKNEY'S CHOICE. THE YOUTH GANGS NEEDED A "TOUGH COP," A NO-NONSENSE HARDLINER, A HATCHET MAN WHO COULD KEEP THE PRESSURE ON AND TAKE THE HEAT FROM THE PUBLIC...THE FACT THAT HE WAS NEGRO WOULD, IT WAS FELT, LESSEN CRITICISM OF

THE GIU, SINCE MOST OF ITS FIRE WOULD BE AIMED AT BLACK GANG MEMBERS.⁷¹

GARLAND DAVIS OF THE OLD YOUTH INTELLIGENCE UNIT AGREES THAT THE NEW GIU WAS A POLITICAL CREATION.⁷² AFTER BEING TRANSFERRED OUT OF THE YOUTH DIVISION, HE AND OTHER YOUTH OFFICERS FINALLY GAVE UP AND FOLLOWED MICHAEL DELANEY OUT OF THE DEPARTMENT. STREET WORK AND THE REHABILITATIVE PHILOSOPHY WERE LEFT FRIENDLESS ON THE POLICE FORCE.

YMCA PRESIDENT JOHN ROOT ALSO AGREES THAT THE NEW POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF GANGS MOTIVATED GIU'S FORMATION.⁷³ HE FEELS THAT THE MOVE WAS MADE POSSIBLE BY AN ATTITUDE PREVAILING IN THE COMMUNITY WHICH SUPPORTED THE CRACKDOWN. INTER-GANG CONFLICT AND PRESS ATTRIBUTION TO GANGS OF ALL VIOLENCE INVOLVING YOUNG BLACKS HELPED TO CREATE THIS ATTITUDE, AND THE "WHITE BACKLASH" MOOD PERPETUATED IT. THIS SENTIMENT ALSO EXISTED AND STILL EXISTS IN THE BLACK COMMUNITIES WHICH WERE THE MAIN VICTIMS OF GANG VIOLENCE.⁷⁴

THE GIU PRESSURE SEEMED TO HAVE POLITICIZED THE SUPER-GANGS. ALTHOUGH THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT HAD NOT CLEARLY BEEN IN THEIR SELF-INTEREST, THE ATTACKS BY THE POLICE MADE IT IN THEIR INTEREST TO OPPOSE THE INCUMBENT ADMINISTRATION. DURING THE 1968 ELECTIONS, THE BLACK P. STONE NATION (BPSN) CONDUCTED A NO-VOTE CAMPAIGN WHICH CUT DEEPLY INTO THE NORMALLY HIGH DEMOCRATIC MAJORITIES ON THE SOUTH SIDE. ALTHOUGH CAPTAIN BUCKNEY SUSPECTED THAT THEY WERE PAID TO DO IT,⁷⁵ THERE ARE OTHER INSTANCES OF POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT BY GANGS WHERE THE STAKES WERE MUCH LOWER AND SUCH PAYMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN ABSURD.

REGARDLESS OF THE MOTIVATION, THE "DON'T VOTE" CAMPAIGN WAS FOLLOWED BY THE EXPANSION OF THE GIU FROM 38 TO 200 MEN SHORTLY AFTER THE ELECTION. THE PRESSURE ON GANGS QUITE OBVIOUSLY INCREASED,

IN MAY OF 1969 MAYOR DALEY ANNOUNCED A "CRACKDOWN" ON GANG VIOLENCE (AT A TIME WHEN GANG VIOLENCE HAD BEEN DECLINING.)⁷⁶

PERHAPS THE TERMS "CRACKDOWN" AND "PRESSURE" SHOULD BE CLARIFIED. MANY TACTICS WERE USED TO PURSUE THE GOAL OF DESTROYING THE GANG LEADERSHIP. STIRRING UP INTER-GANG CONFLICT WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY SPREADING RUMORS AND BY DROPPING MEMBERS OF ONE GROUP DEEP INSIDE THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER GROUP.⁷⁷ ANOTHER TACTIC WAS CONTINUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FORM OF MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS AND STOPPING GANG MEMBERS ON THE STREET FOR QUESTIONING.

IN JUNE OF 1969 A UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO CHURCH GROUP RELEASED A REPORT WHICH CATALOGUED THE MORE GRUESOME GIU ATTACKS ON GANGS.⁷⁸ ALTHOUGH THERE WAS LITTLE CITATION OF REFERENCES, THE REPORT WAS NEVER CHALLENGED. ONE OF THE INCIDENTS FOLLOWS:

LAST MARCH (1969) WHEN SEVERAL RIFLES WERE REPORTED STOLEN FROM THE ROTC UNIT AT TILDEN HIGH SCHOOL, GIU ASSUMED THE RANGERS HAD TAKEN THEM. MICKEY COGWELL, A TOP RANGER LEADER, WAS PICKED UP BY GIU OFFICER STANLEY ROBINSON AND TAKEN TO THE LAKE FROM AT 43RD STREET. A KNOWN NON-SWIMMER, COGWELL WAS TAKEN OUT ON THE ROCKS EXTENDING INTO THE LAKE, AND ASKED WHERE THE GUNS WERE. NO ANSWER. "DOWN ON YOUR KNEES, COGWELL." NO MOVEMENT. ROBINSON BEAT HIM TO HIS KNEES. "WHERE ARE THE GUNS?" NO ANSWER. THE GUN FIRED PAST COGWELL'S HEAD. "WE'LL GIVE YOU TILL 4 O'CLOCK TOMORROW TO TURN OVER THE GUNS. THEN WE'LL KILL YOU." THE GUNS WERE LATER FOUND IN THE WHITE COMMUNITY. COGWELL HAS TAKEN A LIE DETECTOR TEST VERIFYING HIS DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT.

IN SUCH A CONTEXT, POLICE-YOUTH WORKER RELATIONS OBVIOUSLY WERE NOT AS COOPERATIVE AS THEY HAD ONCE BEEN. THE AVERAGE PATROLMAN HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT STREET WORKERS EVEN IN THE HEYDAY OF DELANEY'S YOUTH DIVISION. THE DEMISE OF THE DELANEY - (GARLAND) DAVIS GROUP AND THE RISE OF EDWARD BUCKNEY'S GIU WERE CLEAR INDICATIONS OF THE PROPER ROUTES TO PROMOTION AND AN OPEN MANDATE FOR HOSTILITY TO STREET WORKERS.⁷⁹ YOUTH ACTION DIRECTOR CHUCK CURRY, ACKNOWLEDGING THE POLICE IMAGE OF STREET WORKERS AS "RABBLE ROUSERS," FEELS THAT THE HOSTILITY

WAS INEVITABLE. "WHEN PEOPLE ARE STARVING," HE SAYS, "YOU CAN'T HELP STEPPING ON THE TOES OF THE POLITICAL POWERS, SO THE SOLDIERS ARE SICCED ON YOU."

INDEED, THE SOLDIERS WERE SICCED ON YOUTH ACTION. ON NOVEMBER 19, 1968, THE AUBURN CENTER WAS RAIDED IN A WEAPONS HUNT, RESULTING IN \$250 WORTH OF DAMAGE.⁸⁰ FOUR MONTHS LATER THREE OF THE POLICEMEN INVOLVED WERE SUSPENDED. ON APRIL 15, 1969, THE WOODLAWN YOUTH ACTION CENTER WAS RAIDED WITH THE RESULT OF \$1,000 DAMAGES.⁸¹ THREE WITNESSES GAVE STATEMENTS DESCRIBING THE RAID BUT REFUSED TO SIGN THEM, ALLEGEDLY UNDER THREATS FROM THE POLICE.

IN A MOVE TO PREPARE FOR FURTHER INCIDENTS, YOUTH ACTION EXECUTIVES MET IN JULY, 1969, WITH A VOLUNTEER GROUP CALLED "LAWYERS FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW." THE MEETING ESTABLISHED A PROCEDURE FOR YOUTH ACTION STAFF TO HAVE LEGAL SERVICES AVAILABLE ON A 24-HOUR BASIS.

IN CASE OF A POLICE INCIDENT, A LAWYER WOULD GO TO THE SCENE TO GATHER IMMEDIATELY THE RELEVANT INFORMATION. STAFF MEMBERS WERE INSTRUCTED TO NOTE SUCH ITEMS AS BADGE NUMBERS AND SQUAD CAR NUMBERS.⁸²

WHILE YOUTH ACTION MAINTAINED ITS PUBLIC DIGNITY IN SPITE OF GIU ATTACKS, JOHN FRY'S FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH WAS PUBLICLY SMEARED AS WELL AS HARASSED. IN THE 1968 McLELLAN HEARINGS ON THE T W O JOB-TRAINING PROJECT, WITNESSES OF SOMEWHAT QUESTIONABLE AUTHORITY TESTIFIED THAT THE CHURCH WAS FREQUENTLY THE SCENE OF MARIJUANA PARTIES, SEX ORGIES, DRINKING AND SHOOTING, ALL AT THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF REV. FRY.⁸³ AFTER FRY SECURED A \$50,000 GRANT FROM THE KETTERING FOUNDATION, THE GIU TRIED TO DISSUADE THE FOUNDATION FROM CONTINUING ITS SUPPORT ON THE GROUNDS THAT FIRST CHURCH WOULD NOT CONTROL THE MONIES PROPERLY.⁸⁴

OTHER ORGANIZATIONS WORKING WITH GANGS WERE HARASSED BY THE GIU. THE CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY'S HALFWAY-HOUSES FOR EX-CONVICT GANG MEMBERS WERE RAIDED SIXTEEN TIMES. THE T W O JOB TRAINING PROJECT AND EVEN T W O STAFF MEETINGS WERE SUBJECTED, RESPECTIVELY, TO RAIDS AND SURVEILLANCE.⁸⁵ ONE JOURNALISTS' ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATIONS SEEMED TO BE QUITE ACCURATE: "THOSE KNOWN TO HAVE ANY ASSOCIATION WITH GANG MEMBERS ARE SUSPECTED OF BEING EITHER DUPES, FELLOW TRAVELLERS OR OUTRIGHT SYMPATHIZERS, INCLUDING SOCIAL WORKERS, CHURCHES, FOUNDATIONS, AND WHITE LIBERALS."⁸⁶ /fm

THE ULTIMATE PROOF OF THAT STATEMENT CAME WHEN SOCIALLY PROMINENT ROBERT G. DONNELLY, AN EXECUTIVE OF THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO, WAS GRILLED BY GIU OFFICERS JUST OUTSIDE HIS OFFICE. HIS OFFENSE WAS NOT INFORMING THE POLICE OF A BETTER GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATION LUNCHEON TO WHICH SEVERAL GANG MEMBERS HAD BEEN INVITED. ONE OF THE DETECTIVES DEMANDED OF DONNELLY, "WHY DIDN'T YOU CLEAR YOUR MEETING WITH CAPTAIN BUCKNEY?"⁸⁷ AFTER AN INVESTIGATION POLICE SUPERINTENDENT JAMES CONLISK DECLARED THAT THE GIU WAS MERELY PERFORMING A VALID POLICE FUNCTION.⁸⁸

THE MOST BLATANT INCIDENT OF ALL INVOLVED THE FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, THE MOST ANTI-DALEY OF ANY GROUP WORKING WITH GANGS. AS JOHN FRY DESCRIBED IT,

RANGER LEADERS WERE ASKED TO CONFER WITH U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT AGENTS AND MEMBERS OF THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT FOR THE PURPOSE OF ARRANGING A DISARMAMENT. AS A RESULT, THE RANGERS DID DISARM TO A SIGNIFICANT EXTENT, AND ALL WEAPONS NOT FALLING UNDER FEDERAL JURISDICTION WERE STORED IN A LARGE WALK-IN VAULT ON THE SECOND FLOOR OF THE CHURCH BUILDING. THESE WEAPONS WERE CAREFULLY INVENTORIED BY THE FEDERAL AND LOCAL POLICE AUTHORITIES. YET FOUR MONTHS LATER THESE WEAPONS WERE CONFISCATED IN A "RAID" BY POLICEMEN WHO PRETENDED THEY WERE ACTING ON SECRET INFORMATION THAT GUNS WERE IN THE SAFE, AT LEAST ONE OF THE RAIDERS HAVING HIMSELF HELPED TO PLACE THE WEAPONS THERE.⁸⁹

STREET WORKER RELATIONS WITH THE POLICE BECAME SO BAD BY 1970 THAT FEARS OF WIRETAPPING, LICENSE PLATE LISTING, AND SECRET F B I FILES WERE QUITE COMMON AMONG STREET WORKERS.⁹⁰ LIKE A VOICE OF THE EARLY SIXTIES, GIU SERGEANT FRAZIER SUGGESTED TO THE AUTHOR THAT PERHAPS STREET WORKERS SHOULD SIT DOWN WITH GIU OFFICERS AND DISCUSS THE SITUATION.⁹¹ IT SEEMS, THOUGH, THAT THE TIME FOR SUCH DISCUSSION IS EITHER LONG PAST OR IN THE DISTANT FUTURE.

IN SUCH A POLARIZED SITUATION, THE HISTORIAN CANNOT AVOID DEALING WITH THE QUESTION, "WHO WAS RIGHT?" CHARLES LIVERMORE, FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE CHICAGO COMMISSION ON YOUTH WELFARE, MAKES A VERY STRONG CASE FOR THE GIU. HE FEELS THAT AFTER THE GANG LEADERSHIP BECAME STRONGER THAN THE STREET WORKERS, THE CRIME SITUATION REACHED CRISIS PROPORTIONS. THE DUES CHARGED TO GANG MEMBERS NECESSITATED MANY PETTY THEFTS, BUT VICTIMS WERE INTIMIDATED BY THE STRENGTH OF THE TOTAL GANG. BY LEGITIMIZING THE GANG LEADERSHIP, STREET WORKERS ONLY REINFORCED THIS PATTERN OF WIDESPREAD EXTORTION IN THE BLACK COMMUNITIES.⁹²

HOWEVER, AN ANALYSIS OF POLICE CRIME STATISTICS IN THE CHICAGO JOURNALISM REVIEW SUGGESTS THAT THE "WAR ON GANGS" FOLLOWED A MARKED DECREASE IN GANG RELATED VIOLENCE. FURTHER, IT SUGGESTED THAT STRONG GANG LEADERSHIP PACIFIED THE YOUNGER, MORE VOLATILE GANG MEMBERS AND FACILITATED LOWER CRIME RATES:

NO ONE DOUBTS THAT SOME MEMBERS OF THE GANG SHOOT AND COMMIT ASSAULTS. BUT THE BIG QUESTION ABOUT THE GANG IS, DO MEMBERS ENGAGE IN VIOLENCE AND OTHER CRIMES BECAUSE OF THE GANG (AS MOST CITY OFFICIALS TEND TO THINK) OR DESPITE THE GANG LEADERSHIP (THE VIEW OF MANY YOUTH WORKERS WHO SAY THE LEADERS ARE TRYING TO TURN THE GANG INTO A MILITANT BUT LEGITIMATE ORGANIZATION.) THIS IS AN IMPORTANT QUESTION, BECAUSE IF THE LEADERS ARE CONTRIBUTING TO DELIN-

QUENCY AND VIOLENCE, THEY BELONG IN JAIL; IF THEY ARE TRYING TO SNUFF OUT VIOLENCE TO BUILD BLACK COMMUNITY POWER, THEY DESERVE HELP.⁹³

DRAMATIC EVIDENCE OF THE PACIFYING CAPABILITY OF STRONG GANG LEADERSHIP WAS SEEN DURING THE 1968 RIOTS FOLLOWING THE ASSASINATION OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. THE DISCIPLES AND THE P. STONES COMPACTED A TRUCE AND WENT ABOUT PLACATING THE ENTIRE SOUTH SIDE, WHILE THE CONSERVATIVE VICE LORDS AND THE COBRAS ATTEMPTED TO DO THE SAME ON THE WEST SIDE.⁹⁴ ALTHOUGH CITY OFFICIALS CLAIM EXTORTION OF STORE OWNERS WAS THE MOTIVE, IT SEEMS THAT A GREAT DEALS OF VIOLENCE AND PROPERTY DAMAGE WAS AVOIDED DUE TO THE EFFORTS OF THESE GANG LEADERS.

THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT THE GANGS WERE FINALLY ON THE THRESHOLD OF SIGNIFICANT REDIRECTION OF THEIR ENERGIES FROM VIOLENCE TO CONSTRUCTIVE ACTIVITY. AFTER TEN YEARS OF INTERVENTION BY SOCIAL AGENCIES, A COMBINATION OF POLITICAL-IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS (BLACK-POWER, SELF-DETERMINATION) AND AVAILABLE RESOURCES (THROUGH THE HELP OF YOUTH WORKERS) MADE REAL SOCIAL CHANGE A VIABLE POSSIBILITY. HOWEVER, THE POLITICAL THREAT POSED BY THAT POSSIBILITY PRODUCED A POLICE ATTACK UPON THE GANGS WHICH PREVENTED THEM FROM MAKING REAL PROGRESS. WITH THE LEADERSHIP CONSTANTLY THROWN IN JAIL, THE GANGS REVERTED TO THE VIOLENCE-ORIENTED LIFESTYLES OF THE PAST. BY CREATING THE WORST GANG PROBLEM IN THE COUNTRY, CITY OFFICIALS HAD TO CONFRONT A SITUATION MORE DIFFICULT THAN THE POLITICAL THREAT THEY TRIED TO AVOID.

PERHAPS REALIZING WHAT HAD HAPPENED, THE PRESSURE SEEMED TO BE TAKEN OFF THE GANGS IN THE SPRING OF 1970. FOLLOWING AN UNFAVORABLE REPORT BY A SPECIAL FEDERAL GRAND JURY ON THE KILLING OF BLACK PANTHER FRED HAMPTON,⁹⁵ THREE TOP POLICE OFFICERS WERE DEMOTED.⁹⁶ THIS MOVE HAD BEEN PRECEDED BY THE PROMOTION-OUT OF

GIU-CAPTAIN BUCKNEY.⁹⁷ ONE OBSERVER FEELS THAT THIS COULD HAVE MEANT AN ATTEMPT TO CREATE GREATER HARMONY AND SUPPORT IN THE BLACK COMMUNITY PRIOR TO THE 1971 MAYORALITY ELECTION.⁹⁸

IT TAKES TWO SIDES TO END A WAR, HOWEVER. THE SUMMER OF 1970 WITNESSED FREQUENT SLAYINGS OF POLICE, REPORTEDLY BY GANG MEMBERS. POLICE AGRESSION BEYOND THE CONTROL OF THE MAYOR WAS CREATED BY THE KILLINGS. JEFF FORT, THE "PRICE" OF THE BLACK P. STONE NATION, FOUND THE PRESSURE SO GREAT THAT HE ATTEMPTED TO ESCAPE THE COUNTRY, THOUGH HE WAS APPREHENDED IN NEW YORK IN LATE OCTOBER.⁹⁹

YOUTH ACTION'S FUND RAISING DRIVE EXCEEDED ITS GOAL FOR FISCAL 1970-71,¹⁰⁰ AND THERE EXISTS A SUFFICIENT CONSTITUENCY OF WEALTH TO MAINTAIN THAT SUPPORT. STREET WORKERS, THEN, WILL CONTINUE TO BE IN THE FOREFRONT OF "COMMUNITY POWER" ORIENTED GANG POLITICS, NO MATTER HOW MUCH POLICE PRESSURE THERE IS. AS YOUTH ACTION DIRECTOR CHARLES CURRY PREDICTS, "UNLESS SOMETHING IS DONE TO ALLEVIATE THE PROBLEMS, THE POLICE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO KILL A LOT OF PEOPLE."

CONCLUSION

IN FIFTEEN YEARS OF WORKING WITH YOUNG GANG MEMBERS IN CHICAGO, THE YOUTH WELFARE INSTITUTIONS HAVE CHANGED THEIR PHILOSOPHY FROM MISSIONARY-LIKE PATERNALISM TO CARMICHAEL-LIKE SELF-DETERMINATION. OVER THE SAME PERIOD, THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT CHANGED ITS CHARACTER FROM OLD-STYLE CORRUPTION TO TECHNOLOGICAL PROFESSIONALIZATION AND FINALLY TO A NEW KIND OF SEMI-POLITICIZATION. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS HAVE, CORRESPONDINGLY, GONE FROM INITIAL ADJUSTMENT DIFFICULTIES TO FUNCTIONAL COOPERATION TO OPEN HOSTILITY.

THESE DEVELOPMENTS ARE INDICATIVE OF A LARGER CHANGE WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY, THE CLICHED NAME FOR WHICH IS POLARIZATION. FIFTEEN YEARS AGO THE MAJOR INSTITUTIONS WERE OF ONE PURPOSE AND ETHIC; THERE WAS LITTLE CONFLICT BETWEEN GOVERNMENT, CHURCH, AND YOUTH WELFARE INSTITUTIONS. THE DEEP PROBLEMS OF SOCIETY WERE LARGELY INVISIBLE, AND THEIR TREATMENT WAS THE SUBJECT OF MINIMALLY INTENSE DISCUSSION.

AS THE PROBLEMS BECAME VISIBLE AND THE SOCIETY SPLIT ON THE SOLUTIONS, SOCIETAL INSTITUTIONS HAD TO SHIFT IN ORDER TO SURVIVE. WHO WOULD HAVE SUSPECTED FIFTEEN YEARS AGO THAT THE STAID YMCA WOULD BE SUPPORTING RADICAL SOCIAL CHANGE WITH SUPPORT FROM A CAPITALISTS' FOUNDATION, OR THAT A PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH WOULD BE SUBJECT TO POLICE RAIDS? THUS, GANG WORKER-POLICE RELATIONS HAVE BEEN INEXTRICABLY TIED TO THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS OF THE SIXTIES. HOPEFULLY, BY SAYING SOMETHING ABOUT THOSE RELATIONS, THOSE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS CAN BE BETTER UNDERSTOOD.

FOOTNOTES

1. Herbert Asbury, The Gangs of New York: An Informal History of the Underworld, New York; Alfred Knopf, 1927, p. 118.
2. Frederic M. Thrasher, The Gang, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927, pp. 462-63.
3. Welfare Council of Metropolitan Chicago, Breaking Through Barriers, 1960, p. 64.
4. Files of YMCA of Metropolitan Chicago.
5. James Q. Wilson, "Police Morale, Reform, and Citizen Respect: The Chicago Case" in David J. Bordua, Ed., The Police (New York: John Wiley, 1967) p. 140.
6. Mary E. Blake, "Youth Workers and the Police", in Children Vol. 8, #5, Sept. - Oct. 1961, pp. 170 - 175.
7. Interview with Russell Hogrefe, Executive Director, Chicago Youth Centers, May 6, 1970.
8. Files of the Chicago Youth Centers.
9. Ibid.
10. Interview with Michael Delaney, former Captain, Youth Division, Chicago Police Department, April 30, 1970.
11. YMCA, Op. Cit.
12. Chicago Daily News, October 24, 1959.
13. Chicago Tribune, May 8, 1961.
14. Mary E. Blake, op. cit.
15. Interview with former Captain Michael Delaney, April 30, 1970.
16. YMCA, op. cit.
17. Interview with former Sergeant Garland Davis, May 4, 1970.
18. Chicago Youth Centers, Op. cit.
19. Walter Miller, et. al., "Delinquency Prevention and Organizational Relations", in Stanton Wheeler, ed., Controlling Delinquency (New York: John Wiley & Sons, inc., 1968) pp. 61-103.
20. Sgt. Edward Mulchrone addressing Y's Men's Club of Chicago, October, 1961.
21. Garland Davis, op. cit.

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23. Garland Davis, op. cit.
24. Interview with Bruce Cole, Vice-President, YMCA of Metropolitan Chicago, April 7, 1970.
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